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1 INTRODUCTION
Following the work of Sen (1981), famine analysis
has moved beyond the question of food availability
decline, to the problem of entitlement failure.1 The
famine process is characterized as a collapse in an
individual's ability to legally command food through
the disposal of productive resources or endowments
(land, labour, assets) and exchange in the form of
trade and production. Overlooked in this analysis of
individual entitlement failure vis à vis food in the
market economy, is the parallel collapse of social
structures which sustain important non-market
sources of food in much of the developing world
(Firth 1959; Laughlin 1974; Dirks 1980).
A complex system of social strategies and institu-
tions which work to minimize the risk of food
insecurity has been documented in pre-capitalist
society (Evans-Prichard 1940; Scott 1976; Posner
1980; Platteau 1991; Fafchamps 1992). Based on
kinship, friendship and patronage, this 'moral
economy mediates the flow of non-market claims
and transfers in a variety of forms ranging from
cereal gifts and livestock loans, to migrant remit-
tances, and labour exchange. The right to make
claims on others, and the obligation to transfer a
good or service, is embedded in the social and moral
fabric of the rural community (Mauss 1959, Scott
1976). These principles are sustained in large part by
the long-term self-interest of households in search of
mutual insurance against livelihood insecurity
(Laughlin 1974; Posner 1980; Platteau 1991).
The contribution of non-market transfers to food
security in the contemporary context has been largely
dismissed. With the expansion of market exchange,
population growth and the rise of the modern state,
it is argued that claims and transfers are atavistic
vestiges of a 'merrie' moral economy of times past
(Polanyi 1944, Raynault 1975, Scott 1976, Watts 1984).
As a result, scant attention has been paid to the role
of non-market transfers in preventing famine, nor
the devastating impact of famine-related disloca-
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tion, disease and hunger on the social practices and
institutions which sustain these flows.
This article examines the contribution of non-market
transfers to the food security of Bambara agricultur-
ists in central Mali. Analysis is based on fieldwork
which involved a cross-sectional survey of 7 villages
(150 households) during the harvest seasons of 1988
and 1989, and an 18 month longitudinal study of 33
households in the village of Sèbèkoro (Adams 1992).
After considering the nature of food insecurity in
Mali, the social and economic networks which have
developed to cope with this perennial problem are
described. Highlighting the importance of social
investment and exchange in maintaining subsist-
ence security, the article goes on to explore the
nature and material importance of non-market trans-
fers in coping with food insecurity, including the
characteristics of donor, recipient and excluded
households.
2 FOOD INSECURITY IN MALI
Documented in the early anthropological studies of
the Tallensi in Ghana (Fortes and Fortes 1936), and
the French Colonial Sudan (Pales et al. 1954), the
problem of food insecurity continues to persist in
contemporary West Africa. Given low levels of
technology development and marked variations in
the adequacy of rainfall and its distribution over the
cultivation season, agricultural yields and subse-
quent food security remain in continual peril. Since
independence (1960), Mali has experienced frequent
food crises, most notably the famine of 1968-73, and
the droughts of 1983-84 and 1988. In addition to
these periods of chronic or famine-scale food short-
age, seasonal food insecurity is also widespread in
the region. This period of transitory scarcity tends to
occur in the rainy season prior to the harvest when
cereal supplies are constrained, and energy needs
related to agricultural work reach their peak (Cham-
bers et al. 1981).
Special thanks are extended to Salif Sow and Timothy Evans for their
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Straddling Sudanic and Sahelian climatic zones, the
study region receives between 600 and 800 mm of
rainfall per annum concentrated in a single rainy
season from July to October. Dryland millet produc-
tion is the primary subsistence activity of Bambara
agriculturists, supplemented by the proceeds from
groundnut cash crops, crafts, petty commerce, and
small-scale animal husbandry. Due to inadequate
rainfall in 1988, only 11 per cent of households
surveyed harvested enough millet to supply domes-
tic consumption throughout the year. Among those
households having to procure cereal through other
means, 53 per cent were food insecure as evidenced
by the need to ration and substitute wild foods in
place of cereal. Improved, albeit late rainfall in 1989
enabled 43 per cent of households to meet annual
cereal needs through domestic production, while
only 25 per cent of production deficit households
were food insecure.
In view of this precarious environment, survival
depends largely on the household's ability to mini-
mize risk. A range of strategies is summoned to
enhance subsistence security, and to cope with food
crises when they occur. Cropping strategies such as
early ripening varieties, field dispersion,
intercropping and staggered planting help spread
production risks in time and space (Norman 1977;
Richards 1985), while market gardening, craft pro-
duction, migration, and livestock investment permit
the accumulation of assets to purchase food in times
of need (Lewis 1979, Fulton and Toulmin 1982). Of
concern in this article is the array of non-market
strategies and social institutions such as collective
labour groups, communal fields, village cereal banks,
and kinship and dyadic exchange relationships; all
of which provide a form of welfare or subsistence
guarantee to participant households.
3 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS
At the centre of Bambara social and economic or-
ganisation is the household. Figure 1 illustrates the
networks which the household constructs in pursuit
of subsistence security. Through exchange and so-
cial investment, it attempts to spread risk into ever
widening orbits ranging from village kin, to urban
migrants, market and state.
2 The trend toward thebreaking up of large kinship-based production
units was noted as early as 1934 by French colonial anthropologists
(Labouret 1934). Thegrowing individualizationofproductioncaused
by increasing labour migration and individual incomes earned
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Figure 1: Social and Economic Networks of
Agricultural Households in Mali
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3.1 The household
The Bambara household is a dynamic entity com-
prised of individuals who farm a common field and
who have rights to consume grain from a common
granary (Meillasoux 1981). Subject to continual
variations in rainfall, productive capacity, and con-
sumption requirements, the typical household expe-
riences periods of food deficit and surplus through-
out its lifecycle (Fortes 1949; Goody 1958; White
1980). It is the duty of the household's most senior
male member to control land-use rights, compound-
level goods and the production and reproduction of
household labour in the interests of collective sub-
sistence. While household members have concomi-
tant rights and obligations regarding collective pro-
duction, gender and generational segments of the
household may have social and economic interests
independent, or indeed opposed, to those of the
patriarch. Negotiation between collective and indi-
vidual interests is necessary if a large and cohesive
labour force is to be maintained.2
3.2 The village
The Bambara village is comprised of three main
groups distinguished by the degree to which they
through cash-crop production and market activity are factors
perceived to weaken the traditional strength of the household head
and to promote the fissioning of the household into smaller nuclear
units (Paques 1954; Brasseur 1961; Klaus 1976).
are integrated into social and economic networks of
exchange. In the first group are long-established
households with patrilineal ties which date back to
the origins of the village. The village chief generally
represents the most senior member of the founding
patrilineage.3 Within these established lineage
groups, mutual aid is considered obligatory; more
wealthy households providing an informal welfare
guarantee to poorer kin. In Sèbèkoro, the village
chief supported the near destitute households of a
blind son-in-law and an uncle disabled by leprosy.
The second group includes non-lineage households
either recently established in the village or ostra-
cized from lineage networks due to long-standing
family quarrels. With less developed kinship ties
and minimal obligations to others, non-lineage house-
holds have greater latitude in productive decision-
making, but less access to social and economic sup-
port in the event of crisis. For this reason, non-
lineage groups may try to access social networks
within the village through marriage, while at the
same time, maintain some of their older alliances
through child fostering and seasonal visits to their
villages of origin.4 Relationships between neigh-
bouring non-lineage households are affirmed
through labour exchange, and small gifts of food,
tobacco and cola nut.
Constituting the third group are the households of
blacksmiths, bards, carvers and leather workers
whose special skills afford them a privileged place in
Bambara society (McNaughton 1988). Owning the
rights to arcane, spiritual and technological prac-
tices, they offer these services in return for tributes of
food and cereal.
Cross-cutting the hierarchical household and line-
age stratification of the village are associations which
work to create a sense of equality and community
within the village as a whole (Lewis 1979). Particu-
larly common are labour groups based on the 'age-
set' system. The Ton or cibà is one such obligatory
work group comprised of young men aged 13 to 35.
Although all households with male members in this
age range are expected to participate, it is far easier
for non-lineage households to opt out of communal
labour obligations than for those with strong kinship
affiliations. The ciba provides paid labour during the
With the counsel of elders, the village chief administers and
distributes land to community members, sets the main stages of the
agricultural calendar, acts as a representative to regional government
and arbitrates in cases of dispute (Klaus 1976: 57).
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peak agricultural season on designated days of the
week often chosen in coordination with surround-
ing villages. The proceeds earned by communal
work groups may be used to receive religious and
official visitors or may constitute a fund from which
villagers can borrow if, for example, tax payments
are required before the sale of cash crops.
Other examples of cooperative institutions are asso-
ciations of villagers who cultivate a communal field,
the produce of which is used as a security stock of
seed and cereal. In the event of food shortage, cereal
credit may be obtained and repaid after the harvest.
Six of the seven villages studied cultivated a commu-
nal field of this kind.
3.3 Beyond the village
Extending beyond the village are orbits of exchange
which include neighbouring villages, urban migrants,
market and state. Through marriage, social ties with
surrounding villages are strengthened and subsist-
ence networks diversified. Marriage is a collective
affair in Bambara society, traditionally arranged
between the parents of exogamous lineages. In
Sèbèkoro, 24 per cent of married women came from
households within the village itself, 39 per cent
originated from surrounding villages within a 5 km
radius, while the remainder issued from more dis-
tant regions.
Maintaining and developing social and economic
networks through marriage is a matter of great
importance even if it results in lost production in the
immediate term (Fulton and Toulmin 1982). For
example, during the process of bride price payment,
a prospective husband may be obliged to gather
together members of his 'age-set' and provide free
labour to future in-laws even if this request coincides
with the peak agricultural season. After marriage,
these networks are maintained through visits of
married women to their natal villages, and through
exchanges of gifts and services. In the long-term,
networks established through marriage act as insur-
ance against highly localized differences in farming
fortunes. Many farmers noted how flows of cereal
along the 'marriage road' during periods of shortage
are increasingly important as infra-village lineage
networks weaken through household fission and
migration.
The practice of child-fostering is widespread in West Africa (Bledsoe
et al. 1958). In the viflage of Sebekoro, 10 childless or elderly women
were bequeathed children of matrilineal kin.
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Of similar economic importance are networks be-
tween urban migrants and their households of ori-
gin. Although it is difficult for the household to
make and enforce claims on distant migrant kin,
periodic remittances are critical sources of cash in-
come that may be mobilized during shortage.
With the establishment of regional and local markets
for cash crops, local traders have become a vital
source of cash, cereal and credit for Bambara house-
holds. At the same time as traders speculate and
exploit demand/supply discrepancies for a profit
(Hill 1972), a variety of patron-client arrangements
are apparent between farmer and trader; loyal cli-
ents receiving preferred access to credit, or in some
cases, temporary employment in exchange for ce-
real. The recent liberalization of cereals trade from
a state controlled marketing system has further en-
trenched relations between farmer and trader (Staatz
et al. 1989). By contrast, state involvement in the
study region is limited. State-level infrastructure
and extension services are underfunded and
overextended, while regional cereal food security
stocks are only sporadically reinforced and distrib-
uted (Bulletin SAP 1987-90). NGO assistance is
similarly limited in scope and coverage.
4 THE PURSUIT OF FOOD SECURITY
THROUGH NON-MARKET TRANSFERS
Negotiating the networks described above, rural
agriculturists forge and reinforce obligations of debt
Table 1: Cereal Outflows in Sèbèkoro (kg/hold)
n=33 households
* Domestic production is supplemented by purchases, gifts and credit, hence per cent figures do not add up to 100.
Islamic law requires that 10 per cent of annual production or
mcome, be distributed among the old, the infirm and the destitute.
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
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and favour in pursuit of subsistence security. Non-
market transfers may act to prevent the occurrence
of food insecurity through direct access to food such
as cereal gifts and meal sharing. Alternatively,
access to food may be indirectly transferred through
labour exchange, loans of agricultural inputs which
serve to enhance production, or through capital
transfers, the proceeds of which can be used to
obtain food. This section distinguishes four catego-
ries of transfers: ritual homage and alms, gifts, ex-
change and credit. After Sahlins's (1965) concept of
reciprocity in 'primitive society', these four catego-
ries of transfers can be viewed as a 'continuum of
exchange' distinguished in terms of the 'degree of
tolerance for material imbalance indicated by the
time allowed to reciprocate' (Sahlins 1965: 146-48).
The following analysis considers the normative rules
and obligations surrounding each category of trans-
fer, and the quantity and frequency of the particular
entities being exchanged.
4.1 Homage and almsgiving
In the Bambara village, ritual transfers of homage
and alms are the moral duty of Animist and Muslim
believers alike. Indeed, traditional Artimist prac-
tices such as homage paid to ancestral priests for
good fortune in farming, coexist with or have even
transformed Islamic almsgivirtg and charity to the
destitute (zakkat).5 Offerings to cult priests are pro-
vided to Muslim clerics instead, or to elderly or
infirm relatives thereby fulfilling obligations to kin
and Allah simultaneously (Trimingham 1959: 189)
mean (sd) Season:
TYPE ANNUAL OUTFLOWS PER CENT PROD* HARVEST DRY RAINY
cereal sale 166 (255) 7 81 6 13
salaries 162 (197) 6 146 2 14
consumption 2373 (1535) 93 767 768 838
debt repayment 42 (92) 2 15 24 1
alms given 248 (251) 10 225 21 2
gifts given 255 (364) 10 94 118 43
credit given 9 (28) .3 8 1
TOTAL 3253 1336 994 923
Homage and almsgiving presume that the house-
hold has an economic surplus over subsistence needs
to distribute (Trimingham 1959: 184). While data
from Sèbèkoro indicate a strong positive correlation
between production and almsgiving (r=+0.79
p<O.00I), many production deficit households dis-
bursed a large percentage of their scanty harvest as
alms despite obvious implications for their food
security.
Table 1 summarizes mean household cereal out-
flows for the village of Sèbèkoro. Homage and
almsgiving constitute almost 10 per cent of mean
agricultural production, most of which is disbursed
as zakkat following the harvest. The most frequent
recipients are roving Muslim clerics (26 per cent), the
destitute (17 per cent), representatives of ancestral
spirits (14 per cent) and the village blacksmith (7 per
cent).
4.2 The gift
The second category of non-market transfers is the
gift; a symbolic or tangible exchange of goods or
services that carries with it some obligation to recip-
rocate. Gift exchange provides art important means
of minimizing climatic and demographic risk as
household production and consumption needs vary
over time. Gift-giving cultivates and converts social
resources into a system of mutual insurance so that:
'...(s)he who is in need today receives help from (s)he
who may be in need tomorrow' (Evans-Pritchard
1940:85). Reciprocation need not be immediate, nor
must there be any necessary equivalence to the initial
gift (Sahlins 1965: 160)
Although gift behaviour is more likely to be found in
communities where the kinship idiom prevails, in
the modern Bambara village gift exchange is also
used to assist and validate strong informal ties of
cooperation and trust between individuals and house-
holds unrelated by kinship or marriage. Given the
spacio-temporal variability of cropping fortunes in
this Sudano-Sahelian region, exchange relationships
with households from surrounding villages are also
strategic. Exogamous marriage alliances facilitate a
risk-spreading diversification of social and economic
networks beyond the village. For non-lineage house-
holds, marriage ties within the village or nearby
vicinity provide an expedient way of creating local
kinship links which might be relied upon in case of
crisis.
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As shown in Table 1, 10 per cent of annual millet
production in Sèbèkoro is disbursed as cereal gifts to
kin (22 per cent) and other household visitors (41 per
cent). During the dry season, it is common for
married women to return to their natal villages for
several months at a time. Receiving food and lodg-
ing for the duration of their stay, they are entitled to
substantial gifts of cereal on their departure. Indeed,
whether kin or non-kin, Bambara tradition demands
that all visitors receive gifts of cereal and other
gestures of respect. Supporting Toulmin's observa-
tions near Segu (Toulmin 1986:65), an increase in the
frequency of visits from distant kin, praise-singers
and traveling musicians was noted in the study
region following the plentiful harvest of 1989.
Money gifts from migrant kin also represent an
important yet unpredictable non-market transfer
from which food may be obtained. Over 40 per cent
of households in the region have at least I member
absent on long-term migration. In Sèbèkoro alone, a
total of 10 households received money gifts for
c real purchase during the rainy season months of
June and July: in 7 cases these remittances came from
migrant sons, in 2 cases from other kin. The mean
value of these gifts was 24,000 FCFA, or the equiva-
lent of 480 kilograms of millet at rainy season prices.
Sustaining these more formal gifts of money and
cereal is an under-current of smaller daily transac-
tions of condiments, meals, tobacco and cola-nut
undertaken mainly by women. In Sèbèkoro, 29 per
cent of these transactions involved meal giving,
followed by gifts of cola-nut or tobacco (18 per cent)
and condiments (18 per cent). Most of these gifts
were directed to friends and neighbours (43 per cent)
and post-harvest visitors (19 per cent).
Indirect forms of food assistance may also be pro-
vided through gifts of labour and/or agricultural
equipment which benefit crop production. Table 2
outlines the different types of non-domestic labour
in Sèbèkoro and the percentage of 'out-labour' days
devoted to each. Of interest are the first three
categories of labour exchange which fall under gift
transfers: kin, in-law and charitable labour. A simi-
lar 'obligatory' ethic surrounds each: labour re-
quired by kin behind in their cropping schedule, the
provision of 'age-set' labour to the households of
prospective fathers-in-law, and the supply of chari-
table labour to respected or destitute households or
to those who have experienced misfortune such as
accident, crop damage, or the death or illness of
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Table 2: Non-domestic Labour Exchange in Sèbèkoro: per cent out-labour days per catagory
draught animals. No formal or immediate payment
is required, however, there is an implicit promise of
reciprocal help in the future (Platteau 1991: 142).
Together, 'gift labour' accounts for 13 per cent of
total out-labour days in Sèbèkoro.
A significant positive correlation between house-
hold gift-giving, domestic cereal production and
wealth suggests that generosity may be a function of
a household's productive strength (r=0.51 p<0.Ol).
However, the absence of a significant negative cor-
relation between gift-receiving and agricultural pro-
duction suggests that the food insecure in Sèbèkoro
may not be the major recipients of that generosity
(r=-O.36).
4.3 Exchange
Like Sahlins's notion of 'balanced reciprocity', ex-
change transfers involve the immediate return of
goods and services rendered (Sahlins 1965: 146). In
the Bambara village, exchange largely consists of
labour or capital transfers which act 'indirectly' to
enhance the food security of participant households.
Falling into this category are labour sharing arrange-
ments such as threshing teams which move between
the fields of participant households to accomplish
time intensive tasks more quickly. In the dry season,
kin or neighbouring households form similar work
groups for the purpose of house repair. Labour
exchange of this kind accounts for 25 per cent of non-
domestic labour, most of which occurs in the harvest
and dry seasons. Cibà labour, which accounts for a
is bulletin vol 24 no 4 1 993
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further 28 per cent of non-domestic labour days,
embodies both exchange and market principles.
Although participation entitles households to re-
ceive cibà labour, a standard charge is applied. In
Sèbèkoro, a half day of cibà labour may be requested
on the condition that a 2500 FCFA fee be paid after
the harvest. For poor households, this fee is often
prohibitive, as is the obligation to feed cibà labourers
when cereal is scarce.
Individual labour contracts also mediate important
non-market transfers of cereal. These contracts are
mainly arranged between poor households short of
cereal and more affluent farmers in the vicinity
needing labour during the rainy season. During the
severe food shortage of 1988, 42 per cent of such
contracts involved the exchange of labour for cereal,
while in the remainder of cases a money wage was
used to purchase cereal on the market (Figure 2).
Capital transfers such as the loan of animals in
exchange for ploughing and other agricultural serv-
ices, also occur between kin and neighbour. One
such arrangement was made between a blind house-
hold head, his leper wife and three children, and
wealthy kin. The labour of his eldest son was loaned
to affluent relatives for the duration of the rainy
season on the condition that they cultivate a field of
millet on his behalf. In another instance, a household
agreed to tend the field of a destitute female-headed
household in exchange for the use of her plough.
n=33 households
Category Overall Harvest Dry Rainy
n=1452 n=291 n=325 n=836
kin labour 7 3 11 6
in-law labour 2 - 1 4
charitable labour 4 5 1 5
cibà labour 28 - 25 38
community labour 22 2 20 29
labour exchange 25 73 31 8
labour sale 12 17 11 lo
Total loo 100 100 100
Figure 2: Food Shortage Days Supplied by Market and Non-market Strategies in 1988
maize harvest
non-market credit 7%
labour for cereal 6%
cereal gifts 11%
n=14394 food shortage days, 7 villages in central Mali
wild foods 1%
L ¿U/O premature harvest 11%
labour for cash 9%
market purchases 31%
Inter-ethnic forms of exchange are also common in
the study region. During seasonal migrations,
transhumant Fulbe exchange milk and labour for
cereal cultivated by the Bambara. Similar exchange
relationships are established beween Moor families
who migrate southward from the Sahel at the begin-
ning of the harvest season, and establish temporary
residence on the compound fields of Bambara house-
holds: the host household benefits from soils well-
manured by Moor livestock, while the Moors are
given permission to gather remaining millet at har-
vest threshing sites.
4.4 Credit
Credit transfers demand a stricter schedule of repay-
ment than the other categories of non-market ex-
change. Depending on the degree of intimacy be-
tween partners, interest may or may not be required
in the transaction. Interest-free credit is generally
confined to transfers from village-level cereal banks
or partners of relatively close social span. Negoti-
ated outside of the market, a tacit promise is made to
repay the debt by a certain date, and to extend
similar aid if needed. The interest foregone by the
credit giver can be considered the equivalent of a risk
premium to insure against future contingencies
(Platteau 1991: 151). The threat of social sanctions
and public humiliation is usually sufficient to make
the potential free-rider comply, as is the risk of losing
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credit opportunities in the future. The majority of
cereal loans reported during food shortage periods
in 1988 and 1989 are of this non-market variety
contracted with friends, neighbours, kin and village
cereal banks.
5 NON-MARKET TRANSFERS DURING FOOD
CRISES
While many non-market strategies and institutions
work to reduce the risk of food insecurity, are they
effective in the context of widespread food crises? It
is frequently argued in the literature that non-mar-
ket transfers are irrelevant vestiges of a waning
moral economy, and of little significance relative to
market-oriented strategies widely employed to over-
come food insecurity (Watts 1984). Study findings
confirm that indeed non-market transfers represent
only one of a diversity of coping strategies used to
breach seasonal food deficits. Figure 2 expresses the
relative importance of different food sources in terms
of the percentage of food shortage days they furnish.
Together, non-market cereal transfers comprised of
gifts, non-market credit and labour-for-cereal ex-
change supply almost 25 per cent of food shortage
days in 1988.
However, if the household sample is stratified ac-
cording to whether or not non-market transfers were
received, a different impression emerges. Among
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those households receiving non-market transfers,
cereal gifts or non-market credit supplied over 50
per cent of food shortage days in 1988. Moreover, a
significant correlation between transfers received in
1988 and 1989 suggests that they remain important
strategies from one year to the next (r=0.51 p<O.Ol).
Another literature suggests a deterioration in pat-
terns of socio-economic solidarity and non-market
food transfers with increasing food insecurity (Firth
1959; Laughlin 1974; Turnbull 1982). As household
priorities shift from a concern with long-term soli-
darity and mutual insurance to the problem of im-
mediate survival, a decrease in the quantity and
frequency of exchange is expected. However, when
comparing cross-sectional data from two food short-
age seasons of contrasting severity, an opposite
trend is apparent. During the agricultural season of
1988 when food insecurity was widespread, 27 per
cent of households received food gifts compared to
13 per cent during the mild shortage of 1989. The
quantity of cereal transfers also appears greater in
1988: 16 per cent of the household sample received
net cereal gifts surpassing 20 kg/cu in 1988, com-
pared to 7 per cent in 1989. Similar patterns were
observed for interest-free credit transactions in both
years.
Contrary to the view that food insecurity is incom-
patible with reciprocity, data suggest that moderate
scarcity can engender greater non-market exchange.
In this respect, they support a model proposed by
Dirks (1980) which identifies three phases of social
and economic behaviour as food insecurity intensi-
fies. In the 'alarm phase', or the early stages of
shortage, an intensification of social and economic
activity is expected. Reciprocity and assistance in-
crease and productive alternatives are explored in
the effort to supplement insufficient food stores.
With the 'resistance phase', 'social ties begin to
erode;...conservative measures are introduced that
are antithetical to widespread generosity and broad-
based group action' (Dirks 1980: 28). Sharing net-
works become increasing restricted to close kin and
economic strategies increasingly short-term. Coop-
erative strategies are further eroded as deprivation
reaches the 'exhaustion phase' (Dirks 1980). Al-
though the intensification of non-market exchange
documented in 1988 is reminiscent of Dirks' alarm
phase, a concomitant tendency to confine cereal
transfers to closer kin suggest the beginnings of
'resistance'. Although food insecurity did not reach
the 'exhaustion phase' in the period of study, many
households recalled the devastating impact of
ds bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
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drought periods in 1968-73 and 1983-84. In worst
cases, mounting tensions between gender, genera-
tion and kin provoked the disintegration of house-
hold and village-level organisation.
6 WHO GIVES AND WHO RECEIVES: EQUITY
OR DISPARITY?
Field data suggest thatsome households have greater
access to networks of non-market exchange. At-
tempts to identify their social, economic and demo-
graphic characteristics using logistic regression yields
a model which combines household size, wealth,
proximity of kin, and household age to successfully
predict 65 per cent of production deficit households
receiving or not receiving food transfers. From this
analysis and other qualitative observations, general
typologies which describe donor, recipient and ex-
cluded households are identified:
1 Donor households tend to be large households
self-sufficient in cereal production and well-es-
tablished in village lineage networks.
2 Recipient households tend to be poorer, produc-
tion insufficient households within lineage net-
works which have slumped into poverty through
bad luck (ill-health, disability, crop damage), or
unfavourable lifecycle stage.
3 The excluded tend to be production insufficient
households marginalized from exchange net-
works either by choice, or unwittingly due to a
lack of resources to participate.
Within exchange networks, one-way transfers from
donor to recipient households may be unbalanced
for long periods of time. Far from altruistic, this
imbalance may be used to assert and maintain power
and prestige within lineage networks, or in some
cases, it may be exploited as a means of accumula-
tion and enrichment (Torry 1987; Fafchamps 1992).
In so doing, at the same time as exchange relations
serve a common need for mutual insurance against
risk, they may also accentuate social differentiation
within the village.
Sanctions against overt displays or declarations of
wealth in Bambara society may also be interpreted
against this background. Households who do not
find it in their capacity or interest to transfer cereal
may attempt to mislead others concerning remain-
ing cereal stocks. To avoid the 'humiliation of
hunger', one household in Sèbèkoro retreated to the
lands where unbeknownst to needy kin, lay a cache
of cereal bought with migrant remittances.
In an effort to decrease the observability of their
wealth, other households may shift to forms of
income that are easy to dissimulate (Fafchamps
1992: 153). In the village studied, this trend was
counteracted by barring those who have rejected
subsistence production and participation in solidar-
ity institutions from access to non-market transfers
of labour and cereal. Despite having two eligible
male workers, one newcomer household in Sebekoro
refused to participate in the cibó labour group, pre-
ferring to concentrate its efforts on cash crop pro-
duction. As a consequence, this household was
excluded from village-level decision-making and
the distribution of NGO food aid.
Most vulnerable are non-lineage households who
lack sufficient resources to cultivate transfer net-
works with friends and lineage members through
marriage or exchange (Swift 1989: 13). The isolation
of these households is further exacerbated by an
inability or unwillingness to participate in commu-
nal labour arrangements. Because they tend to be
small in size (Lewis 1981, Richards 1986; Toulmin
1986), these households are less able divert scarce
labour to communal work groups as the immediate
cost to domestic agriculture is often perceived as
greater than the benefits of later and less certain
claims on communal labour. Even if free communal
labour is available, few can afford to feed participat-
ing workers. Migrant networks may be less lucra-
tive for similar reasons as they can ill afford to
release scarce labour resources from domestic pro-
duction (Toulmrn 1986: 61).
In the absence of networks whereby cereal might be
procured as a loan or gift during periods of shortage,
excluded households are forced into volatile wage-
labour and cereal markets. Even then, their relative
poverty restricts access to loans and credit from
market traders (Hill 1972). Subject to onerous inter-
est rates and rainy season prices, they are compelled
to repay cereal loans in cash or kind from harvest
earnings. In Sèbèkoro, almost one-half of produc-
tion deficit households were compelled to sell grain
required for subsistence in order to cover tax, debt
repayment and other social expenditures.
inability of rural households to rely solely on state or
market mechanisms to cope with food insecurity.
Despite the existence of a country-wide early-warn-
ing system, government food aid did not reach any
of the households surveyed in 1988, many of whom
went hungry. While the current orthodoxy expects
the market to take the place of the state, it too has a
flimsy institutional foundation. Not only must farm-
ers pay a premium for service delivery by the mar-
ket, many entrepreneurs are unwilling to engage in
cereal trade given supply and demand uncertainties
associated with extreme variations in rainfall (Bratton
1987; Klaus 1976; Staatz et al. 1989).
In fact, the distinction between 'moral' and 'market'
economies in Mali is blurred by a long history of
coexistence. Commodity exchange blends with pa-
tron-client relations as local market traders provide
interest-free cereal loans to reward the loyalty of
rural clients. In a similar way, the volatility of
cropping fortunes and need for money income has
necessitated the development of broad and diverse
transfer networks which encompass local reciproc-
ity as well as wider orbits of exchange involving
urban migrants, market traders and the state.
Non-market transfers occur alongside a complex of
other coping strategies some of which intensify as
food insecurity increases in scope and severity, and
reciprocity contracts. For households with access to
social networks of exchange, non-market strategies
such as gift transfers, charitable labour and credit
from village cereal banks provide an important means
of spreading risk. Lineage membership is an impor-
tant criterion for participation in these networks.
Not only may lineage households call on the assist-
ance of immediate kin, their social and economic
status facilitates the extension of networks through
exogamous marriage. In thisway, otherwise unviable
lineage households disabled by illness or unfavorable
lifecycle stage are sustained (Lewis 1981: 60).
Excluded from these networks are non-lineage house-
holds unable or unwilling to invest in the social
strategies and institutions which mediate non-mar-
ket exchange. Among the most vulnerable are small,
asset poor households who rarely meet subsistence
needs through domestic production. Without the
benefit of social networks, these households are
forced into volatile wage labour atad cereal markets
in order to survive.
7 DISCUSSION Social strategies and institutions in rural Mali are notThe apparent resilience of the so-called 'moral merely passive structures upon which drought and
economy' in central Mali points to the wariness and
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
famine have a disruptive effect. In view of the
limited competence of state and market, they repre-
sent a vital (but not exclusive) means of minimizing
risk in an uncertain environment. Understanding
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